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The European Council on Foreign Relations recently launched a Scorecard that
evaluates the EU’s influence and role in over eighty foreign policy areas, which
then boil down into six key themes. Karen E.Smith finds the exercise useful in
highlighting issues for concern, and in perhaps persuading European leaders to
engage with foreign policy failings.
The last year has been a turbulent one for European foreign policy. The Euro crisis
has seen the outside world’s perception of the EU’s economic stability take a
significant hit. The Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts in Libyaand Syria have tested the EU’s
foreign policy mettle in its immediate Mediterranean ‘neighbourhood’.
How has the EU responded to these challenges? Earlier this month the European Council on
Foreign Relations (ECFR) launched its European Foreign Policy Scorecard for 2012 at the LSE.
This is a massive and systematic exercise, evaluating eighty different EU foreign policy areas,
boiled down into the six key themes that are shown in the table below. The ECFR also assigns a
numerical mark out of 20 to the EU’s performance, and translates that into a letter grade.
Table 1 – European performance on the six issues in 2011
Broadly speaking, this year’s marks show that the EU ‘could do better’ in virtually all the areas
assessed. It gains its highest overall mark of B on multilateral issues, and its lowest mark of C on
relations with China. Everywhere else the performance is at a C+ level. Furthermore there has not
been much improvement since the last Scorecard exercise in 2010 – the picture is essentially very
little changed, despite the intervening progress in setting up the European External Action Service
(under Catherine Ashton).
This year the Scorecard includes an additional chapter, which explores the positions of the EU
member states on some key policy areas (covering 30 of the 80 areas assessed at the European
level). Here the Scorecard categorises the countries inside the EU as being ‘slackers’, ‘supporters’
or ‘leaders’ on the set of issues. The table below shows the results, with Germany leading the leader
pack, followed by the UK, France and Scandinavian countries, but Italy and the Netherlands well
down the field. Bringing up the rear is Greece, with Spain,  Belgium, Romania and Hungary showing
signs of internal troubles preoccupying their governments and leaders.
Table 2 – Leaders and Slackers for 27 European Union countries, according to European
Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012
I’m sure that all the EU
member states will raise
objections to being
labelled ‘slackers’ in any
policy area, but the
solution lies in the
countries’ own hands, to
be more active next year
and avoid being
categorised as slackers.
What does the
Scorecard tell us?
Of course with any
exercise like this, issues
are bound to arise about
whether it is too
simplistic, or whether the
categorizations stand up
to closer analysis. I deal
with such issues in the
last section below on
Methods issues. Those
(few?) of us who care
about EU foreign policy
are always assessing
developments. We all
certainly have our own
views of how well or
poorly the EU has
performed in this or that
crisis, or on this or that
issue. All that ECFR has
tried to do is to
‘systematise’ judgments
about the EU’s
performance. So let’s
accept for now that the
Scorecard offers researchers valuable assessments of what the EU has been doing in any given
year. Now that comparisons can be made also over time, this value increases.
The real question though is – so what? Does the Scorecard merely record the EU’s growing
irrelevance as an international actor? Is anyone in Brussels or in the various capitals of the 27 EU
member states really listening? And if they are listening, are they concerned? And if they are
concerned, is there anything they are willing to do to improve the EU’s performance? On this last
point, I have my doubts.
The nub of the matter, it seems to me, is to determine why the EU has recently been performing
badly, both in general and in particular policy areas? Is this the fault
Of the EU institutions, with bureaucratic politics preventing efficient policy-making?
Or of the Lisbon Treaty, for introducing new and complicated institutional arrangements?
Of Catherine Ashton, for lack of leadership in the European external Action Service?
Of enlargement, for creating a larger EU which can rarely unite on foreign policy?
Or of all the member states?
Frankly, I think all the member states are implicated in the EU’s dwindling role, as EU member
states ‘renationalise’ their foreign policies – a trend that the ECFR notes in the Scorecard. But then,
why are countries doing so? And why now? Is this only because of the financial crisis, or is there a
deeper malaise? The trends also goes against various theoretical approaches suggesting that the
EU member states should be going the other way. They are supposed to be ‘Europeanising’ to an
ever greater extent
as the central institutions in Brussels grow stronger (or at least grow),
as the member states recognise the utility of acting together rather than acting separately,
and as cooperation and interaction becomes ever more habitual and regular.
Certainly the Scorecard suggests that we are not seeing signs of Europeanization – so if not, why
not? The nature of the Scorecard is such that it cannot provide answers to such questions – it can
merely document the performance of the EU year by year. But if the Scorecard is to have an impact
on actual EU performance, then an analysis of the reasons for why the Union is performing badly (or
well) needs to be undertaken as well.
Methods issues
Finally, let’s turn to whether we should take the Scorecard seriously or not. The ECFR has
highlighted the pitfalls of trying to assess EU foreign policies in the ‘methodology’ chapter of the
earlier 2010 scorecard. This discussion provides a very good survey of the difficulties and
challenges in trying to evaluate EU foreign policy in a systematic way – exploring what counts as a
‘success’, how can we measure unity or use of resources or effectiveness, and so on. I know that
the Scorecard has been criticised by some commentators for being too simplistic, but I think we
cannot deny some value-added in trying to be systematic.
Now for my own three quibbles. The first is that the grading system is such that the EU can hardly
fail. ‘Fail’ requires a score of 0 out of 20. And a ‘D-‘ letter grade can only be achieved by scoring 1
out of 20. It seems to me that this is a pretty easy scoring system – one that no school or university,
certainly, would support. Perhaps the ECFR decided that if it set the bar for ‘fail’ any higher the EU
might receive more Fs?
My second quibble is with the scoring on the new theme, which is the Middle East and North Africa.
Here the ECFR’s scores do not appear to coincide even with the ECFR’s own commentary in the
Scorecard document. For example, the EU earns a B+ for its ‘policy’ on the Libyan uprising, despite
the considerable lack of unity among member states on Libya. The commentary even implies that
‘Europe’ (and particularly those European states that contributed to the NATO military intervention)
earned the B+, not the EU. The EU’s policies towards North Africa and the Middle East, both before
the ‘Arab Spring’ and after it, have been criticised (rightly and heavily|) by commentators and
scholars across Europe and the Mediterranean region. These numerous criticisms are not
adequately reflected in the Scorecard.
My third, more minor quibble is that ECFR gives the EU a relatively strong grade of B+ for its
performance in advancing human rights at the UN. The EU has been quite united here, but this
grade does not take into account the very limited impact the EU had on the ‘review’ of the Human
Rights Council in 2011 – which essentially resulted in little change to that institution.
The European Council on Foreign Relations launched its 2012 European Foreign Policy
Scorecard at the LSE in early February, at an event co-sponsored by the LSE’s European
Institute and European Foreign Policy Unit. Mark Leonard, ECFR Director, and Justin Väisse, co-
author of the Scorecard, presented the second of these annual assessments of EU foreign policy,
with comments from Thomas Valacek of the Centre for European Reform and Karen E. Smith.
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